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Rich TV, Poor TV: Work, leisure and the construction of ‘deserved inequality’ in 
contemporary Britain  
 
Jo Littler and Milly Williamson 
 
Introduction 
In January 2017, the UK ITV show This Morning featured a woman, Deborah Hodge, who 
had recently appeared on the Channel 5 reality TV show On Benefits. Phillip Schofield, one 
of the show’s presenters, told Hodge that it ‘quite frankly got my back up’ that she had spent 
£10 on two bottles of prosecco (fizzy Italian wine) at Christmas and was filmed saying 
‘cheers to the taxpayer for my gift’. The incident was widely reported as Schofield losing his 
temper, with headlines including ‘Schofield blasts This Morning guest’ and ‘Schofield hits 
out at mum’ (Minn 2017). The story and its wider amplification in the media worked on a 
number of discursive levels. It concertedly stoked pre-existing debate and moral panic about 
‘benefits scroungers’. The arrival of this motif on a show previously distanced from such 
moral condemnation was itself an event marking the further encroaching of such discourse 
into the mainstream. Meanwhile, left commentators – relatively marginalized in the UK 
media landscape –   pointed out that such ‘fauxrage’ enabled moral posturing about the 
fecklessness of the poor. In the memorable words of Guardian columnist, Phil McDuff, ‘even 
if they hung old sacks at their window in lieu of curtains and ate cold beans by the light of 
recycled candles’ to save money, any pleasurable consumption would be considered frivolous 
waste. Such indignation, he writes, ‘is a vicious reaction against the poor’s presumptuous 
insistence on experiencing life as if they were as fully human as the rest of us’ (McDuff 
2017). It was also pointed out that whilst the presenter Philip Schofield was castigating the 
unemployed about how they spent ten pounds, he was being paid a two-million-pound salary 
by ITV and had a private net worth valued at twelve million pounds (Singh 2009; The Richest 
2017).  
 
The benefits ‘scrounger’ and the celebrified but abject reality TV performer are two central 
contemporary media images of working-class people in the UK media. Both are frequently 
depicted as ‘morally repugnant’ (Tyler 2013) and their construction resurrects elements of 
long-standing classed social types that are part of a ‘continuous morality play’ though which 
the media reasserts dominant social values (Golding and Middleton, 1982, 238). The current 
resurrection of the welfare ‘scrounger’ type has been joined by a new social type – the 
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feckless, leisured ‘ordinary’ celebrity – and we suggest that they are two sides of the same 
coin. Both have ideological taproots that extend back at least into the 19
th
 century, and are 
contemporary mediated manifestations of older discourses of the workshy, spiv or shirker. 
Both are ideological responses to a broader economic and political crisis extending back to 
the 1960s; both are also the main fodder of reality TV today because they are cheap-to-make 
formats in the context of rising costs, declining audiences and declining advertising revenue. 
Television production companies and broadcasters have utilised reality TV since the late 
1990s as a cost-cutting mechanism through the exploitation of ordinary people in the media 
and a means by which to attack the conditions of workers in the television industry (Collins 
2008, Williamson 2016). Both of these ‘social types’ of reality TV feature working-class 
subjects who do not work and who are demonised, vilified and depicted as amoral and/or 
excessive, although in different ways, as a result. While those on benefits are usually depicted 
as deviant and pathological, working-class celebrities on shows such as Love Island (ITV2, 
2015 -), Ex On The Beach (MTV, 2014 - ) and Geordie Shore (MTV 2011 - ) are regularly 
shown as ‘bad subjects’ for taking part in conspicuous leisure as part of the labour of reality 
TV, often fuelled by excesses of alcohol and sex.  Both figures were elided together in the 
case of Deborah Hodge, Schofield’s guest on This Morning, given her role as a mother of 
four who had given up her job as an art teacher in order to try to ‘make it’ on reality TV and 
buy the house she was currently renting. Hodge was featured in a number of stories in the 
press, particularly Mailonline, which interviewed her about her plans whilst simultaneously 
viciously castigating her for her foolishness and recklessness (Waterlow 2016a, b). 
 
This chapter will examine both representations of working-class ‘lack’, contrasting them with  
forms of glamorous ‘overwork’ recurring in representations of the rich, and connecting both 
to the political and cultural economy of their televisual production. For whilst configuring the 
working-class as an underclass through ‘poverty porn’ has expanded in this neoliberal era of 
a viciously widening gap between rich and poor, so too has the extravagantly favorable 
representation of the super wealthy. In Britain this has particularly taken the form of lavish 
costume heritage dramas about aristocratic culture such as The Crown ( Netflix 2016 – ), 
Downton Abbey (ITV 2010 – 2015), and Victoria (ITV 2016). In contrast with the shoestring 
production values and exploitative payment of celetoid reality TV stars, these programmes 
are opulent productions which package British upper-class life for a global, and particularly a 
transatlantic, market. In contrast with the depiction of working- class leisure as irresponsible 
and reckless, aristocrats are today recurrently depicted as hardworking and responsible. 
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Whilst both these tropes have, to be sure, very long-standing histories, their particular 
visibility at the present time and the specificities of their contemporary cultural expression 
are important. The juxtaposition of the ‘hardworking’ rich and the ‘lazy’ poor on British 
television works both as an ideological justification for  the continually extending chasm 
between wealth and poverty. At the same time their significantly different production values 
offer material evidence of classed investment in television production.  In this short piece we 
unashamedly operate on a broad canvas by selecting salient examples of the rich and the poor 
on TV in contemporary Britain in order to provide a form of class and media analysis through 
what we consider to be eclectic but important juxtaposition. To begin with, we will look at 
the figure of the ‘scrounger’.  
 
 
The Return of ‘Scroungerphobia’ 
The benefits ‘scrounger’ is as much a staple on British reality TV as the ‘ordinary’ celebrity. 
Indeed, sometimes they are one and the same, as participants in benefits ‘documentaries’ are 
in effect temporarily celebrified. ‘White Dee’, for example, a key character on Benefits 
Street, was the subject of extensive media commentary (Allen et al 2014). At a time when the 
Conservative government in Britain is making £12 billion cuts in welfare payments in the 
service of austerity, leading politicians and their allies in the media have demonized welfare 
claimants by stigmatising them and by linking them to criminal and anti-social activity, and 
to already demonized and criminalized sections of the population – immigrants, gypsies and 
single mums – further vilifying those groups. As Peter Golding and Sue Middleton argue in 
their landmark analysis of images of welfare, ‘The poor have been a nuisance, a threat and a 
financial burden throughout our history, and explaining their continuing and irritating 
presence has been a persistent problem of the ideologists of capitalism’ (Golding and 
Middleton 1982: 186).  
 
The benefits ‘scrounger’ is an important figure in the project and is not a new media 
phenomenon. It made a spectacular appearance in the British media in the 1970s as the 
‘welfare scrounger’ in order to explain, or rather, explain away, rising poverty. Three tropes 
were mobilised in the mid 1970s - individualism, moral pathology and efficiency - in order to 
blame the poor for the crisis of capitalism by explaining broader economic problems (and in 
particular the fiscal crisis) as the outcome of a bloated and overly generous welfare state 
being exploited by ‘welfare scroungers’ (Golding and Middleton 1982 226). The media Comment [DJ1]: Correct authors? yes 
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created a sense of moral outrage between the ‘law abiding majority and the deviant claimant’ 
(83) in order to supply a set of explanations and rationalisations that shifted attention away 
from rising unemployment and refocused, and individualised, social problems and issues. The 
news media played a key role in this regard. By the mid 1970s, stories of welfare abuse 
managed to shift the narrative from one of concerns about benefit fraud into a more general 
suspicion of the welfare apparatus and the values which underpinned it, as part of a process 
of ideologically dismantling the welfare consensus (Golding and Middleton 1982).  
 
The image of the scrounger has been deployed by large sections of the UK media in order to 
popularise ‘opposition to the welfare system based on the twin themes that it was both 
unnecessary and an excessively costly burden’ (Golding and Middleton 109). Golding and 
Middleton suggest that ‘scroungerphobia’ developed in the 1970s in order to ‘remoralise the 
workless millions to ensure the continued vitality of the work ethic and the preservation of 
law and order’ in the context of economic crisis and, by 1980, the largest increase in 
unemployment since the 1930s (109).  But the fiscal crisis (the blame for which was being 
dumped at the door of the ‘welfare scrounger’) was in fact the manifestation of wider 
structural problems facing British capitalism. Throughout the 20
th
 century the private sector 
in the UK faced a crisis of accumulation, which was lower in Britain than in most major 
industrial nations. Capital investment was low throughout the post-war period (mostly hidden 
until the 1960s) and continues to be low, creating a long-term, ongoing crisis in productivity. 
Consequently, the ‘seeds of the neo-liberal attack on the welfare state have long been 
germinating in the soil of post-war economic uncertainties, even though not finally 
transplanted into the sunlight of popular debate until the 1970s’ (Golding and Middleton 
224).  
 
That crisis has only deepened in the subsequent decades, as Britain became the test-bed for 
neoliberalism in the Global North after the government made a deal with the IMF in 1976 
(Hall 1998, Harvey 2005, Klein 2008).
i
 Neoliberalism vigorously promotes corporate power, 
the marketization of collective forms of public provision, and the idea that competition is a 
ruling principle for all areas of life. This formation attempts to push forward and colonise 
new ground wherever it can; and just as the culture of Thatcherism tapped into pre-existing 
beliefs about welfare and poverty at a moment of economic crisis, so too has the economic 
crisis and political uncertainty of our time found right-wing expression in a new 
demonization of the welfare ‘scrounger’.  
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In 2013 Conservative politicians reanimated longstanding motifs of a ‘division between those 
who apparently reap the comfortable benefits of welfare dependency and those whose 
inadequately rewarded labours finance them’ (Golding and Middleton, 1982, 107), by 
suggesting, as did the then Prime Minister David Cameron, that claiming benefits was a 
‘lifestyle choice’. On the eve of announcing draconian cuts in welfare payments, Cameron 
claimed that, ‘No-one wants to work hard every day and see their hard-earned taxes being 
used to fund things they themselves cannot afford or keep generations dependent on 
welfare’.ii However, while in the 1970s it was the tabloid press that amplified these views, 
today it is reality TV which has been at the forefront of this endeavor, with all five terrestrial 
channels in the UK churning out ‘documentaries’ and docu-soaps about people on benefits. 
From Channel Four’s notorious format pioneering Benefits Streets (2014) to the BBC’s We 
All Pay Your Benefits (2013), Britain’s broadcasters have whipped up anger and resentment 
at those depicted on ‘handouts’ in the service of audience ratings. The tabloid press both feed 
off and cash in on this demonization by running stories about the characters from these 
shows.  However, while earlier incarnations of the welfare scrounger were put into service to 
hide poverty, or deflect attention away from it (Golding and Middleton 1982), one of the key 
ideological planks in the current construction of the ‘welfare crisis’ is the view that welfare 
itself  is one of the major causes of poverty rather than say, zero-hours contracts and greater 
job insecurity, falling wages, redundancy, the contraction of traditional manufacturing 
industries (see Jensen and Tyler 2015; McRobbie 2018). The construction of welfare 
dependency as a cause of poverty circulates around ‘bad subjects’ who are constituted as 
abject, and as Angela McRobbie demonstrates, these representations are often focused on 
women (McRobbie 2018). Jensen and Tyler suggest that this is mediated through notions of 
intergenerational worklessness, drug dependency, anti-social behaviour, troubled families, 
teenage pregnancy, single mums, the workshy and ‘benefits broods’– the portrayal of people 
who have large families ostensibly to increase their benefits (Jensen and Tyler 2015). Both 
McRobbie and Jensen and Tyler argue that the production and repetition of ‘revolting 
subjects’ is a central mechanism through which today’s anti-welfare common sense is 
crafted. These shows combine a longer-standing construction of welfare claimants as ‘taking 
advantage’ and as chaotic, with the more recent idea that welfare recipients are trapped in 
poverty because they receive benefits. The overall impression they engender is that welfare 
claimants are either undeserving and manipulative, or will be better off if their money is 
taken away or cut.  
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While all channels have indulged in this form of ‘poverty porn’, it is Channel Five that 
dominates the field in this kind of diet. Channel Five’s most recent offering The Great British 
Benefits Handout (2016) was preceded by at least 16 shows of this kind, each with ‘benefits’ 
in the title, each of which tackled the motifs of welfare dependency outlined by Tyler and 
Jensen above. But, unlike the BBC or Channel Four, Channel Five is an independent 
broadcaster whose regulatory remit is closer to ITV, so we must ask why it seems to be the 
channel that most enthusiastically pushes the Conservative government agenda in its aberrant 
construction of welfare claimants.  Part of the answer is to do with the fortunes of the channel 
and its strategies for revenue generation in what has been a flat advertising environment for 
UK TV from the beginning of the 21st century. Channel Five emerged in the combined 
regulation-lite and increasingly commercial policy environment of the late 1990s. This policy 
environment (which promoted deregulation, increased competition and commercialisation) 
occurred simultaneously with the the introduction of new technology, channel proliferation 
and media convergence. The result was an international crisis in the television industry with 
rising broadcasting costs and a simultaneous loss of revenue (Deery 2014, Raphael 2004, 
Williamson, 2016). The television industry responded in several ways to this crisis, including 
a series of cost-cutting exercises (Raphael, 2004, Williamson 2016), and commercialising 
programmes as fully as possible (Deery 2014).  
 
In the UK, the result was the Communications Act of 2003 which lifted cross media 
ownership caps and enabled non-European organisations to entirely own a British television 
company. The logic of Channel Five in this context primarily worked to offer a commercial 
diet of entertainment built on a developing business model of buying in cheap production 
formats and already tried-and-tested series in order to maximise advertising revenue. Even so, 
this strategy did not initially pay off for the relatively small entity that was Channel Five in 
an atmosphere of mergers and acquisitions that had resulted from deregulation, and which 
produced the growth of enormous media giants. In 2010, Channel Five was operating a loss 
of £48 million (Sweney 2016). That year the channel was acquired by Richard Desmond, 
(owner of the media group Northern Shell) for £103 million with promises of investment in 
new programmes and programme development (Knight 2012). Instead, Desmond and 
Northern Shell set about making the company a profitable investment for shareholders and 
future possible acquisitions. This involved beefing up its advertiser-friendly programming, 
including its reality TV offerings, by acquiring shows like Big Brother from Channel Four, as 
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well as poaching the life-on-benefits format from Channel Four.
iii
 Although the channel still 
lost £13 million under Desmond’s ownership in the nine months to September 2014, it 
demonstrated that it was the kind of commercial entity ripe for acquisition by a multinational 
conglomerate interested in increasing the bottom line. And in 2014, enabled by the 2003 
legislation, it was bought by Viacom for £463 million – more than triple its sale price to 
Desmond just four years earlier. Desmond reportedly paid himself and his top executives 
£100 million in bonuses, and Viacom set about using its size and strength to effect a 40% 
increase in ad revenue for the channel within the first year. Its first step was to shut down 
Channel Five’s own sales operation, with a loss of almost 100 jobs (Sweney 2016) 
and outsource its £300m-plus TV ad sales business to Sky until 2020 (Channel Five Annual 
Report 2015).  Linking up with Sky enabled Viacom to negotiate better advertising deals with 
media agencies because of it its size in the market. Channel Five cites Benefits Britain: Life 
on the Dole as one of the channel’s highlights for ad revenue (Channel Five Annual Report 
2015, 215).  
 
Through these economic and cultural channels, Channel Five has engaged in a form of right- 
wing populism, of giving expression to “common sense,” of voicing ‘what everyone knows’ 
by reanimating longstanding images of welfare abuse and dependency and thus itself helping 
to recreate the mythology of welfare scroungers that it seeks to evoke, and it does so as a 
central plank in a programming  strategy that is less concerned with the quality of its content 
than it is with the business of attracting as much advertising revenue as possible for as little 
outlay as possible.  These images come at a time of increased marginalisation of working-
class people from public culture, the decline in the numbers of working-class actors, the 
decline of thoughtful, multifaceted narratives of working-class experiences, and the decline 
of pride in working-class identity and collectivity (Jones 2016; Friedman et al 2016; Skeggs 
2004).  We have seen the winnowing of the space for participation of working-class people in 
the British media both behind the screen and in front of it, and an increase in  twenty-first-
century ‘poverty porn’ where they are subject to ridicule, denigration and abjection – in short 
‘scroungerphobia’.  
 
Celebrity and Class in Reality TV 
But this sub-format of reality TV is not the only one which benefits from the manipulation of 
images of working-class ‘worklessness’ to cash in on unacceptable version of leisure. Today, 
reality TV is populated with working-class reality celebrities who perform a version of 
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‘leisure’ which is depicted as ‘hedonistic, irresponsible and raucous’ (Kay 2017), and which, 
at the same time, denies the labour of these performances (Turner 2010, Wood et al in this 
volume) and hides the profitable surplus value extracted from them (Williamson 2016). 
Wood, Kay and Banks argue that the construction of disgust is very much a classed 
phenomenon that is dependent upon the denigration of working-class performances of leisure 
as ‘illegitimate labour’. They argue that the work of ordinary celebrities in reality TV is 
considered ‘not real work’ and that reality celebrity ‘has come to symbolise the antithesis of 
commitment to a career – rather, it signifies a particular kind of narcissistic worklessness’ (in 
this volume; see also Skeggs and Wood 2011, 2012).  
In the UK, the three most popular of these shows are Geordie Shore, The Only Way is Essex 
and Ex On the Beach. These shows are filmed in spaces that might be more closely associated 
with the conspicuous consumption of Thorstein Veblen’s traditional ‘leisure class’ than with 
the mise-en-scene of working-class ‘graft’1 – Mediterranean beaches, yachts, exclusive 
resorts with swimming pools and bars, nightclubs and restaurants. However, these settings 
and the participants who populate them are framed as imbued with a sense of repugnant 
excess – showing too much flesh and emotion, too much interest in sex, drinking and 
swearing, and too little middle-class cultural capital. Traditional spaces of leisure are also 
invaded by the visibility of intimate ‘backstage’ spaces such as the bedroom and the toilet, 
and the ‘private’ activities that occur in such spaces, including sexual intercourse, vomiting, 
and defecation, contributing to a sense of these celebrities as abject. But there is also a sense 
of troubling anxiety, as reality celebrities have become what Jilly Kay terms a new working-
class-based ‘illegitimate leisure class’ (Kay 2017) that, while it is denigrated in the wider 
media and commentariat, also provides working-class viewers with an “opportunity 
structure” (Allen and Mendick 2013, p.87) at a cultural and historical moment when the 
creative arts are increasingly closed to the working-class. These shows and the celebrities that 
perform on them are denigrated because they offer a version of conspicuous consumption to 
working-class audiences in images that may be the inverse to Veblen’s leisure class; but are 
considered no less ripe for emulation.  
Nonetheless, celebrities on reality TV are usually unpaid or badly paid for their performances 
(Williamson 2016) and instead they must generate a precarious income by promoting 
products online or at appearances at nightclubs (Wood 2016). Wood et al (in this volume) 
                                                 
1
 In the UK, ‘graft’ refers to tireless hard work and a ‘grafter’ is one who is industrious. 
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point out that this precarity is gendered, and it takes a particular toll on female working-class 
bodies. For example, female reality celebrities put on weight prior to the release of a fitness 
DVD in order to be photographed as ‘overweight’, so that they can later appear trim and ‘fit’ 
to promote the DVD. Rather than an ‘easy pay check’ this gendered labour involves 
‘intensive corporeal toil’ Wood et al (in this volume). The character and terms of celebrity 
promotional labour differ between upper-middle-class celebrities and working-class 
celebrities. The wealthy celebrities of E4’s Made in Chelsea are less dependent on selling 
their labour through promotional work than are their working-class counterparts in Geordie 
Shore, and at any rate ‘tend to get more lucrative, enduring and less ad-hoc endorsement 
contracts’, such as Made in Chelsea’s Binkie Felsted gaining a contract as the new face of 
Reebok (Kay 2017). Unlike their working-class counterparts, the worklessness of the upper- 
middle-class celebrities of Made in Chelsea is ‘normalized’ as appropriately performed 
leisure through their knowledge of proper class-based conduct in the glamorous venues of 
leisure. 
 
Reinventing the rich: aristocrats ‘learning to labour’ 
Working-class subjects on reality TV, a genre related to a specific and exploitative mode of 
television production, are then today insistently being presented as the undeserving poor, 
feckless in their leisure. By contrast, the marked trend in televisual presentations of the 
British rich occupies very different symbolic and economic terrain and has been expanded by 
a recent spate of extremely popular  lavish TV period dramas devoted to the aristocracy, 
including the ITV dramas Downton Abbey and Victoria and the Netflix dramatic serial The 
Crown. The latter was widely reported as being ‘the most expensive TV show ever made’ 
with a reported budget of $100 million for two series (Lewis 2016; Loughrey 2016).   
 
Such shows clearly build on a longer tradition of British heritage drama, including 
Upstairs/Downstairs in the 1970s and the enthusiastic embrace of historical aristocrats by the 
1980s silver screen, particularly in Merchant-Ivory films such as Chariots of Fire (1981) and 
Howard’s End (1992). The latter have been frequently and accurately read in the context of 
the rise of a 1980s neoconservative Thatcherite agenda which promoted and sold a 
reactionary version of the past to legitimate its present via what came to be termed ‘the 
heritage industry’, a complex which also includes new forms of heritage experience attraction  
as well as ‘heritaged’ lifestyle brands (Hewison 1987, Harvey 1991, Higson 2001, Littler and 
Naidoo 2004). Just as these earlier visual texts worked hard to celebrate aristocratic culture, 
Comment [JD2]: Works Cited says 
2001. 2001 is correct so I have 
changed it here. 
Comment [JD3]: Add to Works 
Cited. Added but needs page numbers. 
Jo: done 
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so too do these current versions, which have mushroomed in appeal, cost and reach to an 
extent not seen since the 1980s.  Given this symbiosis it could also be noted that alongside 
the continuation of the neoliberal agenda of marketization and competitiveness, Prime 
Minister May’s combination of a populist, demotic appeal made explicitly to the working-
class with an extremely punitive agenda and eager embrace of authoritarian despots in pursuit 
of financial profit is more than a little reminiscent of Thatcher’s regime.   
 
In terms of our interests in classed dynamics of work and leisure, there are several interesting 
features operating in these recent aristocratic dramas which seem to be both part of an 
extended cultural continuum since the 1980s and to offer something qualitatively new and 
specific both in terms of cultural production and representational dynamics in this different 
conjuncture. In the process of depicting aristocrats who have extensive leisure time, many of 
these programmes are extremely keen to emphasise the story that they work very hard: that 
they are tireless ‘grafters’ in the service of the common good. The Crown, for instance, starts 
this process early on in its first episode, where the future queen is learning from her dying 
father about the graft and craft of monarchy. Their talking point is the sheer volume of papers 
that the King has to read from his government, a task he is presented taking very seriously, 
and conducting in a far more adroit manner than those in the cabinet (‘I turn them over so I 
see the ones they don’t want me to see’ he says of the large box of files left for him by the 
Prime Minister).  
 
Indeed the whole series is in many ways the story of aristocrats learning to labour, focalized 
through an invited identification with the queen’s neck-twitching repressed emotional life and 
no-nonsense stoicism which are necessary attributes of the job. We are encouraged to admire 
the extent of this emotional labour as part of, and alongside, a wider repertoire of skills the 
Queen is depicted acquiring. (It is notable that this largely sympathetic, dramatic portrait 
includes a sympathetic and romanticised framing of its relationship to imperialism, reducing 
imperial subjects to sentimental story-line fodder). Being monarch is portrayed as such a 
weighty burden it killed George VI; ‘the responsibility of becoming king killed your father!’, 
says the Queen Mother in the third episode.  
 
As Michael Billig put it, when we are talking of the royal family we are talking of other 
issues too (Billig 1992), including nation, community, family and inequality. The favorable 
presentations of the monarchy might be part of a longer tradition which ebbs and flows, but 
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its marked resurgence, and the lavish effort and expenditure on it at this time of expanding 
plutocratic power, when eight people own the same wealth as half the world, is no accident 
(Oxfam 2017). The wealth of the monarchy is of course hereditary, accumulated over 
centuries, and the strategies of cultural legitimation for such power have a long and 
undistinguished history (Clancy 2015). Nonetheless, the monarchy is used to validate the 
accumulated wealth of other plutocratic elites. Even the reporting of the lavish budget in the 
tabloid press is couched in terms of class deference – the Mirror online tells its readers that 
The Crown may be the most expensive television show ever made – ‘but we think it might 
just be worth every penny’ because of the ‘attention to detail’ and ‘award winning’ 
performances. The paper reports with glee the £200k cost of a 30 second scene of a train 
(Jeffries and Methven 2016). The justification of the expense of depicting the on-screen 
Royals has distinct echoes of those deployed on the cost of the actual Royals, and in the 
former case, this is funded by one of the top streaming services, Netflix, who are using their 
strong market position and resources to establish their ‘quality’ credentials through narratives 
of the monarchy in order to consolidate that market position. There are what we might term 
‘feedback loops of cultural validation’ between the monarchy, the aristocracy, plutocrats and 
capitalists. On a practical material level, this occurs when Conservative governments agree to 
make the Queen exempt from tax or donate £370 million to refurbish Buckingham Palace in a 
time when the amount of homeless people living on the streets has risen by 16% (Davies 
2016; BBC 2017).  Crucially, on a cultural and symbolic level, it works to validate the 
principle of inherited wealth. As Andrew Sayer argues in Why We Can’t Afford The Rich, 
obtaining income from existing assets that yield rent, interest or capital gains, is unearned 
income, and people who gain this income are rentiers (Sayer 2016; also see Lapavitsas 2013). 
It is a form of wealth extraction, but it becomes packaged as, and confused with, wealth 
creation. A neoliberal political system supports, above all, rentier interests, in which the 99% 
become increasingly indebted to the 1%. Because contemporary plutocrats, like aristocrats, 
often leverage their inheritance through unearned income (like Donald Trump in the US, or 
the Duke of Westminster in Britain) becoming rentiers in the search for more wealth, there is 
a vested interest in their mutual validation.  
 
The wildly popular UK TV drama Downton Abbey (ITV/PBS 2015) is instructive here. A 
joint US/UK production, it depicted a British stately home in the early decades of the 
twentieth century and the varied, interwoven lives of its inhabitants, from cooks to ladies, 
butlers to lords. Fashioning British heritage for the domestic and international export market, 
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it had extremely and at times unprecedentedly high ratings across a wide range of countries 
including China, Brazil, Singapore, Denmark, Israel, Belgium and Iceland (Egner 2013). Like  
The Queen, Downton displayed lavish aristocratic lifestyles, whilst similarly offering some 
contextual historical background that depict key events within a very conservative narrative. 
The key difference is of course the greater amount of screen time devoted to the working-
class members of the household; although in tune with the dramatic, conservative tenor, they 
are overwhelmingly depicted as knowing and being happy with their social station (Littler 
2017).  
 
Whilst Downton includes a variety of depictions of the rich, it overwhelming presents them 
as extremely hard-working subjects. The Earl of Grantham and his American heiress wife 
Cora (again, symbolizing the mutual marriage of aristocracy and plutocracy) are hard-
working paternalists who construct hospitals for their village and act like kind parents 
nurturing their subjects. One of their daughters becomes a hard-working ‘new woman’ and 
magazine editor; another expends extensive effort branching out into the pig farming 
business. The majority of these aristocrats are not depicted as leisure-class scroungers but 
rather as noble industrious (and proto-feminist) subjects. In the process, these social and 
economic elites acquire the patina of cultural worth through their association with ‘hard 
work’. Hard work is an attribute with classed connotations which has become wrenched from 
the working-classes and re-gifted to the rich, and it is notable that plutocrats across the 
spectrum use such imagery and language to justify their privilege (Khan 2010, Littler 2017). 
Downton also depicts the changing historical landscape as one where some social change is 
considered impossible for that moment (notably, combating racism –  a ‘mixed race’ 
relationship is deemed impossible), whilst other kinds of change are embraced and depicted 
as inevitable, particularly that of aristocrats becoming businessmen/women and developing 
‘enterprise initiatives’ around, for example, housing, car dealerships, and pig farming (Littler 
2017). In the process, the cultural and symbolic traffic between inherited wealth and 
capitalism becomes revalidated.  
 
 
The contemporary construction of ‘deserved inequality’  
Through these engaging dramas and shaming shows the divergence between rich and poor 
becomes validated as a historical truth and justified present. Both construct the image of 
contemporary inequalities as being, above all, deserved. The dream of a ‘life of leisure’ may 
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be expanding in the context of neoliberal ‘austerity’, of growing precarious working 
conditions and longer hours for less pay; but reality TV recurrently turns leisure into labour 
for the predominantly working-class contestants of such shows (and their audiences), whose 
convincing performance of leisure (often highly sexualized and gendered) is being exchanged 
for a shot at fame. Those who already have ample leisure are being insistently presented as 
hardworking, whilst those who have nothing must work at convincing performances of  a 
leisured existence.  
 
There are of course many other classed representations and subjects we have not discussed 
whose presence feeds into this wildly  unequal economic order; the ‘good’ working or 
middle-class neoliberal subject, who works hard, goes the extra mile, works beyond what 
they are supposed to. This is part of the core message of the iconic morality play of The 
Apprentice (Couldry and Littler 2011; Littler 2007) whose mobile neoliberal meritocratic 
subjects validate the divergent social order and rampant inequality; they present the dream of 
social mobility as a possibility rather than horrendously difficult and improbable in Britain’s 
stagnant economy. Just like the representations of rich and poor we have considered in this 
chapter, these depictions connect to a much wider issue of the neoliberal self in which the 
‘good’ subject is one who overworks. Of course, the irony is that workers in the UK work 
longer hours for less pay than their European counterparts, and a smaller proportion are 
unemployed. It is not insignificant that at a time when depictions of supposed working-class 
fecklessness abound, in contrast to portrayals of aristocratic and upper-middle-class hard 
work and prudence, British workers are working harder for less pay while the unearned 
income of the rich rockets. These symbolic inversions of work and worklessness serve to 
further discipline an already overstretched working-class in an economy of declining 
productivity,  which is due, not to a lack of ‘graft’, but to lack of investment and increased 
exploitation.  
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